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Abstract 
Recent studies document that some CEOs are overconfident. In this note, we examine the effect of CEO 
overconfidence on bank risk taking. We measure CEO overconfidence using press data, and bank risk taking using the 
standard deviation of stock returns. Controlling for a number of CEO- and bank-specific variables, we find that banks 
managed by overconfident CEOs take more risk.
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     1 Introduction
One well-documented fact in the social psychology literature is that people tend to be
overcon￿dent (e.g., Kidd 1970, and Moore 1977). Recently, researchers ￿nd that CEOs are
no exception to this rule (e.g., Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2008). Indeed, Goel and Thakor
(2008) argue that overcon￿dent managers are more likely to become CEOs. In this note,
we examine the e⁄ect of CEO overcon￿dence on bank risk taking.
Theory suggests that CEO overcon￿dence can a⁄ect risk taking in at least two ways.
First, overcon￿dent CEOs tend to overestimate the precision of exogenous noisy signals
(Gervais et al. 2009, and Goel and Thakor 2008). Second, overcon￿dent CEOs tend to
underestimate the riskiness of future cash ￿ ows (Hackbarth 2008, 2009). Either way,
overcon￿dence leads to more risk taking.
Empirically, a major di¢ culty is to construct a plausible measure of overcon￿dence. In
this note, we follow Malmendier and Tate (2008) and measure CEO overcon￿dence using
press data. Speci￿cally, we hand-collect articles published in The American Banker that
characterize a sample CEO as con￿dent or cautious. We classify a CEO as overcon￿dent if
he is more often characterized as con￿dent than as cautious. We are able to collect a large
number of articles that meet the selection criteria described in Malmendier and Tate
(2008), because The American Banker provides an extensive coverage of the U.S. banking
industry on a daily basis.
We construct a sample of banks over the period 1993￿ 2006, and a measure of risk taking
using the standard deviation of daily stock returns. After controlling for a number of CEO-
and bank-speci￿c variables, we ￿nd that CEO overcon￿dence is associated with increased
bank risk taking: all else equal, banks managed by overcon￿dent CEOs are 6% riskier.
2 Prior research on bank risk taking
Prior research has identi￿ed several determinants of bank risk taking that we brie￿ y
discuss below. These include ownership structure, franchise value, CEO compensation, and
bank size.
A large body of literature ￿nds that ownership structure a⁄ects bank risk taking. In an
important paper, Saunders et al. (1990) ￿nd a positive relation between insider ownership
and bank risk taking. Looking at a di⁄erent sample period, Chen et al. (1998) ￿nd an
opposite result. Anderson and Fraser (2000) show that the relation between insider
ownership and bank risk taking depends on bank regulation. During periods of relative
deregulation, the relation is positive, as documented in Saunders et al. (1990). During
periods of re-regulation, the relation can become negative, as documented in Chen et al.
(1998). Esty (1998) ￿nds that banks subject to stricter liability rules take less risk. Gorton
and Rosen (1995) propose a model of corporate control and ￿nd evidence that ownership
structure is important in explaining the bank failures in the 1980s. Laeven and Levine
(2009) ￿nd that bank risk taking varies positively with the comparative power of
1shareholders. They also ￿nd that the e⁄ectiveness of certain bank regulations depends on
bank ownership structure. Pathan (2009) ￿nds that strong bank boards positively a⁄ect
bank risk taking, while CEO power negatively a⁄ects bank risk taking.
In banking, franchise value refers to the capitalized value of a bank￿ s future pro￿ts.
Franchise value is lost when a bank fails. Thus, it provides banks with an incentive to take
less risk (Marcus, 1984). In an important paper, Keeley (1990) documents a decline in
bank franchise value in the 1960s and 1970s. He also documents a negative relation
between franchise value and bank risk. Keeley concludes that increased competition
reduced bank franchise value, which then led to increased risk taking. Gan (2004) notes
several econometric di¢ culties associated with previous studies of franchise value and risk
taking. To overcome these di¢ culties, she uses the Texas real estate collapse in the 1980s
as a natural experiment, and ￿nds evidence consistent with Keeley (1990). Demsetz et al.
(1997) study the interactions between ownership structure and franchise value. They ￿nd a
positive relation between insider ownership and bank risk taking, but only at low franchise
value banks. At high franchise value banks, there is no such relation. They conclude that
franchise value can mitigate risk-related agency problems at banks.
Several papers examine the e⁄ects of CEO compensation on bank risk taking. In an
early work, Houston and James (1995) ￿nd that bank CEOs are less likely to participate in
stock option plans, and receive a smaller percentage of total compensation in stock options
than CEOs in other industries. They conclude that CEO compensation in banking is not
structured to promote risk taking. This situation has changed, however, following
deregulation. In a more recent paper, Chen et al. (2006) ￿nd that banks have increasingly
employed stock option-based compensation, and such compensation induces risk taking.
Using a more accurate measure of CEO risk-taking incentives generated by stock options,
Mehran and Rosenberg (2008) obtain similar results.
Finally, size also a⁄ects a bank￿ s risk-taking policy. Demsetz and Strahan (1997) ￿nd
that large banks are better diversi￿ed than small banks. They also ￿nd, however, that
large banks have used their diversi￿cation advantage to pursue riskier lending and operate
with greater leverage. As a result, better diversi￿cation does not translate into reduction in
total risk.
3 Sample and variables
3.1 Data sources
We begin with a sample of bank holding companies (￿banks￿ ) that are included in the
Standard & Poor￿ s ExecuComp database during 1993￿ 2006.1 For these banks, we obtain
1Our sample starts in 1993, because the starting year for CEO compensation data in the ExecuComp
database is 1992, and we use one-year lagged CEO compensation data in our regressions. Our sample ends
in 2006, because the recent ￿nancial crisis started in 2007. During the crisis, some bank CEOs tried to
maintain investor con￿dence in their banks. Articles based on quotes of such CEOs may not re￿ ect their
true characteristics.
2stock return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), year-end
accounting data from the Federal￿ s Reserve￿ s Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank
Holding Companies (FR Y-9C), and CEO compensation data from ExecuComp. Since our
regression analysis requires the use of lagged data on CEO compensation, we drop all
bank-year observations in which there is a change of CEO. We also drop observations with
incomplete data. Our ￿nal sample includes 739 observations on 121 banks and 177 CEOs.
3.2 Measuring bank risk taking
Following prior literature (e.g., Chen et al. 2006, Demsetz and Strahan 1997, Mehran
and Rosenberg 2008, and Saunders et al. 1990), we measure bank risk taking using stock
data. For a given bank in a given year, risk is the standard deviation of the bank￿ s daily
stock returns in that year. This measure captures the overall risk-taking activities of a
bank.
3.3 Measuring CEO overcon￿dence
Following Malmendier and Tate (2008), we measure CEO overcon￿dence using press
data. Speci￿cally, we search for articles published in The American Banker between 1992
and 2005 that characterize a sample CEO as con￿dent or cautious. An article is
categorized as con￿dent if it refers to a sample CEO using the terms ￿con￿dent,￿
￿con￿dence,￿￿optimistic,￿or ￿optimism.￿An article is categorized as cautious if it refers
to a sample CEO using the terms ￿cautious,￿￿conservative,￿￿practical,￿￿frugal,￿
￿reliable,￿￿steady,￿￿not con￿dent,￿or ￿not optimistic.￿We hand-check each article to
make sure that the term refers to the CEO in question.
For a given CEO in a given year, we construct an indicator variable, TOTALcon￿dent,
that equals one if the total number of con￿dent articles until that year exceeds that of
cautious articles, and zero otherwise. We construct another variable, TOTALmentions,
that equals the total number of articles published in The American Banker until that year
that mentioned the name of the CEO.
Table I reports the summary statistics of the press data for the sample CEOs. There
are a total of 352 articles, including 221 articles that characterize a sample CEO as
con￿dent, and 131 articles that characterize a sample CEO as cautious. These articles
cover a variety of topics such as the CEO, company earnings, a merger or acquisition, and
the banking industry in general. Table I also reports the source of assessment, i.e., the
identity of the person who characterized the CEO. As in Malmendier and Tate (2008), a
larger number of con￿dent articles are based on CEO quote, indicating that con￿dent
CEOs are more outgoing and assertive.
3.4 Other control variables
We control for a number of CEO- and bank-speci￿c factors. Several papers ￿nd that
CEO compensation a⁄ects bank risk taking (e.g., Chen et al. 2006, and Mehran and
3Rosenberg 2008). However, in a recent paper, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) ￿nd that
banks with higher option compensation for their CEOs did not perform worse during the
recent ￿nancial crisis. To account for CEO compensation incentives, we include delta and
vega in the regressions. Delta is the change in the dollar value of the CEO￿ s wealth for a
one percentage point change in the bank￿ s stock price. Vega is the change in the dollar
value of the CEO￿ s wealth for a 0.01 change in the annualized standard deviation of the
bank￿ s stock returns. We calculate delta and vega using the one-year approximation
method developed in Core and Guay (2002).
Demsetz and Strahan (1997) ￿nd that bank size a⁄ects risk taking. Large banks are
better diversi￿ed, but they also operate with higher leverage and engage in riskier activities.
We measure size as the natural logarithm of total assets (in thousands of dollars).
Capital can a⁄ect bank risk in at least two ways. First, all else equal, higher capital
implies lower probability of default. Second, higher capital implies that bank owners have
weaker incentives to take risk. We measure capital as the ratio of book value of equity to
book value of assets.
Franchise value also a⁄ects bank risk taking. A higher franchise value means that the
bank has more to lose in case of bankruptcy (e.g., Keeley 1990, and Marcus 1984). This
reduces the risk-taking incentives of the bank. Following prior literature (e.g., Keeley 1990),
we measure franchise value as the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets.
Market value of assets is the sum of market value of equity and book value of liabilities.
Several papers ￿nd that banks have shifted toward activities that generate noninterest
income, and greater reliance on noninterest income is associated with higher risk (e.g.,
DeYoung and Roland 2001, and Stiroh 2004, 2006). Following Stiroh (2006), we measure a
bank￿ s exposure to noninterest activities as the ratio of noninterest income to the sum of
net interest income and noninterest income.
3.5 Summary statistics
Table II reports the summary statistics of the sample. Average risk is 0.017 with a
standard deviation of 0.006. Average delta is $603,950 and average vega is $182,587. The
variation in either delta or vega is substantial, which is not surprising since the optimal
compensation contract for a CEO is likely to be a⁄ected by a number of factors such as the
degree of risk aversion of the CEO and the investment opportunity set of the bank. The
TOTALcon￿dent variable shows that about 26% of CEOs in our sample are overcon￿dent.
An average bank in our sample has a franchise value of 1.117 and a noninterest income of
0.364.
44 Empirical results
To examine the e⁄ect of CEO overcon￿dence on bank risk taking, we estimate the
following equation:
Riski;t = ￿0 + ￿1 ￿ TOTALconfidenti;t￿1 + ￿2 ￿ TOTALmentionsi;t￿1 (1)
+￿3 ￿ Deltai;t￿1 + ￿4 ￿ V egai;t￿1 + ￿5 ￿ Sizei;t￿1 + ￿6 ￿ Capitali;t￿1
+￿7 ￿ Franchise valuei;t￿1 + ￿8 ￿ Noninterest incomei;t￿1 + ￿t + "i;t;
where ￿t are year ￿xed e⁄ects, and "i;t is the error term. All the independent variables
except year ￿xed e⁄ects are lagged by one year to avoid endogeneity problems.2 We
estimate equation (1) using pooled ordinary least squares with clustering of standard errors
at the bank level.
Column (1) of Table III reports the regression results. The coe¢ cient on
TOTALcon￿dent is positive and signi￿cant, indicating that banks managed by
overcon￿dent CEOs take more risk. To gauge the economic signi￿cance of this e⁄ect, we
note that the average risk for banks in our sample is 0.017 (see Table II). Thus the
coe¢ cient on TOTALcon￿dent implies that, all else equal, banks managed by overcon￿dent
CEOs are 6% riskier.
The regression results for control variables are generally consistent with our
expectations. The coe¢ cient on TOTALmentions is not signi￿cant, indicating that the
total number of articles is not directly related to subsequent bank risk taking. The
coe¢ cient on either delta or vega is not signi￿cant, indicating that CEO compensation is
not related to bank risk taking during our sample period. This result is consistent with
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), but di⁄ers from Mehran and Rosenberg (2008).3
The coe¢ cient on size is negative and signi￿cant. This result is consistent with the view
that large banks are better diversi￿ed (Demsetz and Strahan 1997). The coe¢ cients on
capital is negative but not signi￿cant. The coe¢ cient on franchise value is not signi￿cant.
The coe¢ cient on noninterest income is positive and signi￿cant, indicating that greater
reliance on noninterest income is associated with higher risk. This result is consistent with
the ￿ndings of DeYoung and Roland (2001) and Stiroh (2004, 2006).
To check whether the documented e⁄ect is present in both large and small banks, we
split the sample banks into groups of large and small banks, and estimate equation (1)
separately for each group. Column (2) reports the regression results for large banks. The
2Press coverage su⁄ers from an important endogeneity problem (see Malmendier and Tate 2008). For
example, when a CEO engages in high-risk activities, he may be perceived as con￿dent by the press, or he may
try to convey con￿dence to investors. To alleviate this concern, we lag TOTALcon￿dent and TOTALmentions
by one year. To further alleviate this concern, we note that most articles in our sample are not directly
related to risk taking (see Table I).
3When we estimate equation (1) using the same sample period (1993￿ 2002) as in Mehran and Rosenberg
(2008), we ￿nd a result very similar to theirs. Namely, vega is positively and signi￿cantly related to risk
taking, and delta is not related to risk taking. Thus, the di⁄erence between our result and that of Mehran
and Rosenberg (2008) is mainly due to the di⁄erence in sample period.
5coe¢ cient on TOTALcon￿dent is positive and signi￿cant. Column (3) reports the
regression results for small banks. The coe¢ cient on TOTALcon￿dent is not signi￿cant.
However, in terms of sign and magnitude, it is very similar to the one reported in column
(1) for the full sample regression.4 These results indicate that the e⁄ect of CEO
overcon￿dence on bank risk taking is likely to present in both large and small banks.
We recognize that CEO overcon￿dence may be endogenous. For example, riskier banks
may be more likely to hire overcon￿dent CEOs (perhaps because overcon￿dent CEOs
underestimate risk and thus require a lower compensation). A usual empirical method to
overcome endogeneity is to use instrumental variables. Unfortunately, we are not able to
￿nd valid instruments for CEO overcon￿dence. This remains a challenge for future research.
5 Discussion
Our ￿nding adds to the banking literature that examines the determinants of bank risk
taking. Prior studies have identi￿ed several factors (such as ownership structure,
managerial compensation, and bank size) that a⁄ect the risk-taking behaviour of banks.
Our ￿nding suggests that CEO overcon￿dence also a⁄ects bank risk taking.
Our ￿nding also adds to the risk-related literature in general. It is well-known that
managers usually have weaker risk-taking incentives than do well-diversi￿ed shareholders
(e.g., Amihud and Lev 1981, and Jensen and Meckling 1976). One way to mitigate
risk-related agency problems is through managerial compensation (e.g., Coles et al. 2006,
and Smith and Stulz 1985). More recently, researchers have developed models in which
CEO overcon￿dence can also mitigate risk-related agency problems (e.g., Gervais et al.
2009, and Goel and Thakor 2008). Our ￿nding provides some empirical support to their
models.
Our ￿nding has an important policy implication. In many countries bank regulators
rely primarily on capital requirements to constrain banks from taking excessive risk. A
major rationale is that higher capital requirements imply higher loss for bank shareholders
in case of bankruptcy, and thus provide them with an incentive to take less risk. Our
￿nding suggests that some banks take high risk because they are managed by overcon￿dent
CEOs. Increasing capital requirements may not cause such banks to reduce risk taking,
because overcon￿dent CEOs believe that they are acting in the best interests of
shareholders. Thus, additional regulations, such as restrictions on bank investment
activities, may be warranted.
4This lack of statistical signi￿cance is likely due to the fact that CEOs of smaller banks receive less press
coverage. (The correlation between TOTALmentions and Size is 0.67 in our sample.) Thus, it is di¢ cult to
accurately measure overcon￿dence of CEOs of small banks using press data. The large standard error of the
coe¢ cient on TOTALcon￿dent is consistent with this interpretation.
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8Table I. Summary statistics of the press data
This table presents the summary statistics of all the articles published in The American
Banker between 1992 and 2005 that characterize a sample CEO as con￿dent or cautious.
The articles are categorized using the criteria developed in Malmendier and Tate (2008).
An article is categorized as con￿dent if it refers to a sample CEO using the terms
￿con￿dent,￿￿con￿dence,￿￿optimistic,￿or ￿optimism.￿An article is categorized as
cautious if it refers to a sample CEO using the terms ￿cautious,￿￿conservative,￿
￿practical,￿￿frugal,￿￿reliable,￿￿steady,￿￿not con￿dent,￿or ￿not optimistic.￿Source of
assessment is the identity of the person who characterized the CEO.
Full sample Con￿dent Cautious
Number of articles 352 221 131
Article type (percent)
About the CEO 19% 20% 18%
About company earnings 29% 29% 27%
About a merger or acquisition 18% 14% 24%
About banking industry 13% 15% 8%
About other (e.g., dividend) 22% 22% 21%
Source of assessment (percent)
CEO quote 44% 54% 27%
Journalist￿ s assessment 41% 39% 44%
Other assessment (e.g., analyst) 15% 6% 30%
9Table II. Summary statistics of the sample
The sample consists of 739 observations on 121 banks and 177 CEOs from 1993 to 2006.
Risk is the standard deviation of the bank￿ s daily stock returns in a given year. For a given
CEO in a given year, TOTALcon￿dent is an indicator variable that equals one if the total
number of con￿dent articles published in The American Banker until that year exceeds
that of cautious articles, and zero otherwise. TOTALmentions is the total number of
articles published in The American Banker until that year that mentioned the name of the
CEO. Delta is the change in the dollar value of the CEO￿ s wealth for a one percentage
point change in the bank￿ s stock price. Vega is the change in the dollar value of the CEO￿ s
wealth for a 0.01 change in the annualized standard deviation of the bank￿ s stock returns.
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets (in thousands of dollars). Capital is the ratio of
book value of equity to book value of assets. Franchise value is the ratio of market value of
assets to book value of assets. Noninterest income is the ratio of noninterest income to the
sum of net interest income and noninterest income.
Standard 25th 75th
Mean Deviation Percentile Median Percentile
Dependent variable
Risk 0.017 0.006 0.013 0.016 0.020
CEO characteristics
Delta ($ thousands) 603.950 876.997 120.251 277.571 701.524
Vega ($ thousands) 182.587 288.384 27.619 70.539 198.411
TOTALcon￿dent 0.263 0.440 0.000 0.000 1.000
TOTALmentions 28.959 44.340 5.000 13.000 30.000
Bank characteristics
Size 16.859 1.313 16.751 15.757 17.716
Capital 0.083 0.017 0.072 0.081 0.093
Franchise value 1.117 0.095 1.055 1.096 1.151
Noninterest income 0.364 0.163 0.251 0.324 0.430
10Table III. The e⁄ect of CEO overcon￿dence on bank risk taking
This table reports regression results that relate bank risk taking to various CEO and bank
characteristics. All regressions include year-￿xed e⁄ects but their coe¢ cients are not
reported. Intercepts are not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signi￿cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample Large Banks Small Banks
TOTALcon￿dent 0.00110** 0.000899* 0.00102
(0.000516) (0.000477) (0.000984)
TOTALmentions 3.84e-06 -4.36e-06 -3.06e-05
(8.23e-06) (7.44e-06) (3.42e-05)
Delta 7.08e-07 8.04e-07 1.12e-06**
(5.26e-07) (6.06e-07) (4.70e-07)
Vega -8.98e-07 -1.78e-06 -2.14e-06
(1.30e-06) (1.26e-06) (3.70e-06)
Size -0.000965*** 0.000496 -0.00267***
(0.000326) (0.000459) (0.000521)
Capital -0.0244 -0.0320* -0.0183
(0.0155) (0.0173) (0.0204)
Franchise value 0.00366 0.00870** 0.00140
(0.00356) (0.00413) (0.00524)
Noninterest income 0.00581*** 0.00530*** 0.00592*
(0.00185) (0.00146) (0.00329)
Number of observations 739 371 368
R-squared 0.644 0.791 0.595
11